Introduction
This article considers to what extent an attack against members of the armed forces can be a crime against humanity (CAH). It specifically analyses this issue within the context of the crimes perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge, a communist regime who held power in Cambodia from April 1975 to January 1979, and were responsible for the deaths of an estimated 1.7 million people.
1 For the last decade, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) has been attempting to hold former Khmer Rouge cadres accountable for their crimes, and has thus far found three individuals guilty of CAH, amongst other offences. However, as explained by Judge Bohlander in the amicus call:
It seems that an argument could be made that…the entire distinction between combatants and civilians might only make sense if we are talking about combatants and civilians of the enemy population…One could further argue that it would a) seem beyond dispute that a regime which in peace times tried to cleanse its own armed forces of, for example, all soldiers holding a particular ethnicity or faith, would under international customary law be engaging in a variety of crimes against humanity, because the victims' combatant quality merely because they are soldiers would be entirely irrelevant in this context, and that b) there is no reason to think otherwise if such a campaign happened in the course of or otherwise connected to an armed conflict.
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The factual context to this legal problem is contained within Cases 003 6 and 004 7 at the ECCC.
It appears that the legal issue identified by the OCIJ has arisen in the context of attempting to prosecute a number of accused for internal purges perpetrated against Khmer Rouge cadres during the regime. As noted by the OCIJ, the issue of what effect the presence of soldiers or combatants among a target group has on the interpretation of 'civilian population' for the purposes of identifying a CAH becomes a vital legal issue when regimes target their own soldiers. The situation is complicated further by the need to ascertain customary international law at the time of the crimes, thus requiring particular consideration of jurisprudence prior to [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] .
The authors were involved in the submission of an amicus on this issue. At the request of the OCIJ, the submission did not apply its legal findings to the specific context of the ECCC, but explored the issue as an abstract question of law. In this article, we wish to put forward some 5 Supra, note 3, para. 5. 6 the ECCC has the opportunity to contribute significantly to the development of international criminal law. An in-depth analysis of this area of law is therefore particularly timely.
This article shall proceed as follows. We shall first provide some factual background by exploring the phenomenon of internal purges during the Khmer Rouge era and outlining some of the crimes allegedly perpetrated by the accused in Cases 003 and 004. We shall then explore the creation of CAH, which emerged as a way of addressing what was later described as the 'protection gap' between genocide and war crimes. 9 We then examine the customary international law applicable between 1975 and 1979. We argue that the law at this time permitted members of the armed forces to be considered civilians for the purposes of CAH, and that the OCIJ would be justified in adopting such an approach. We then analyse recent developments in contemporary international criminal tribunals. While these developments are outside the period under discussion, they may provide guidance, as the language of Article 5 of the ECCC Statute reflects contemporary formulations of CAH. We argue that while international criminal law continues to acknowledge that attacks against members of the armed forces may amount to CAH, recent jurisprudence has adopted a restrictive approach which goes against the spirit in which the crime was created, and reopens the 'protection gap'. We argue that not only is a less restrictive interpretation justified by our analysis of the law at the 8 Call for Submissions, supra note 3, para. 4. relevant time, it is also appropriate in light of the spirit in which CAH was created. Thus, the OCIJ has the opportunity to both clarify the law, and oppose this restrictive interpretation.
Purges and Persecution under the Khmer Rouge
The Khmer Rouge purges undoubtedly constituted a significant source of death and suffering during the regime. 10 Former cadres have spoken of Pol Pot's plan to address 'betrayal' within the party, 11 and to 'smash' those who were seen as 'impure'. 12 The result was a massive wave of internal purges that led to the deaths of thousands of cadres. 13 The violence accelerated throughout the regime, as the Khmer Rouge 'purged and re-purged itself'. 14 It appears that the standard purge process was to send trusted cadres into an area and systematically arrest and execute local officials, 15 while the Khmer Rouge leaders publicly denounced the victims as enemies. 16 Many were sent to the infamous S-21 security centre, where, of the 14,000 individuals murdered, it is estimated that more than 1,000 were Khmer Rouge soldiers.
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In his call for amicus submissions, the International CIJ spoke of 'a regime which… tried to cleanse its own armed forces of, for example, all soldiers holding a particular ethnicity or faith.' 18 This may be interpreted as a reference to the strong discriminatory nature of many of the purges, and to the broader discriminatory policies that the Khmer Rouge directed against has been historically considered as constituting a victim of such crimes. Case law will be used to demonstrate that while CAH are often defined as being perpetrated against 'civilians', this has historically been interpreted broadly, allowing members of the armed forces to be victims of CAH perpetrated by their own state.
Defining Crimes Against Humanity
One of the primary purposes behind the conception of CAH was the protection of the human rights of all people within a state against widespread or systematic brutality committed by governments or other organizations. 37 From the earliest attempts to define crime 'against the laws of humanity' following the First World War, through to the first codifications of CAH in the aftermath of the Second World War, it is evident that the legislation was designed to protect the human rights of all individuals. 38 The concept of CAH was initially linked to international humanitarian law, 39 an area of law that has historically drawn a distinction between civilians and combatants, 40 but has also sought to ensure that individuals' rights are protected during conflict. While the absolute protection of civilians during conflict must be balanced against military necessity -which may justify an otherwise unlawful act against the civilian population or a civilian object -an attempt to narrow 'protection gaps' is nonetheless evident in international humanitarian law. 41 The Fourth Geneva Convention, for instance, focuses on the notion of protected persons, providing that: When determining the applicability of the 'crimes against humanity' label to crimes perpetrated against Khmer Rouge cadres, it is the last element, defining 'victimhood' and 'civilians', that is the most important, and which will be particularly considered in the following sections.
The 'Civilian' Requirement
Following This definition is significantly closer to that used by the ECCC, and merges the two categories of CAH together, entrenching the civilian requirement into incidences of persecution.
Certainly, the drafting process demonstrated a state practice to include a 'civilian' requirement. 65 However, these sources illustrate that prior to 1975 differing approaches existed with regards to the inclusion of a civilian requirement in cases of persecution. Furthermore, the creation of these legal instruments included relatively little consideration of the definition of a 'civilian', or whether combatants could be victims. 66 It is therefore worth considering how case law interpreted the 'civilian' requirement. German marines who tried to escape from Denmark following Germany's partial capitulation.
Exploring the boundaries of 'Civilian'
The Court noted that actions between soldiers could constitute CAH, if it could be shown that the 'action at issue can belong to the criminal system and criminal tendency of the Nazi era'.
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In the H. case, the same Court found that a judge who had sentenced to death two officers of the German Navy could be held guilty of CAH to the extent that his action was undertaken deliberately in connection with the Nazi system of violence and terror.
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From this analysis, it can be seen that customary international law at the time of the Khmer Rouge crimes incorporated a broad conception of who could be a victim of a CAH. The status of victims has been repeatedly found to be irrelevant, where the crimes were perpetrated in the context of states practising hegemonic political ideologies enforced through arbitrary and violent systems. There is therefore a strong case in support of the International CIJ's supposition that a regime which, during an armed conflict, tried to cleanse its own armed forces definitions to reflect their specific contexts and were not intended for future application.
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Nonetheless, these tribunals have considered the appropriate definition of the term 'civilian', and have in some instances used similar formulations of CAH to that utilised by the ECCC. As such, they can provide guidance on possible interpretations of CAH, the term 'civilian', and the possibility of armed forces being victims of CAH perpetrated by State actors. It will be demonstrated below that while nothing in this jurisprudence explicitly excludes members of the armed forces from being victims of CAH, a more restrictive interpretation of 'civilian' has emerged, which the ECCC has the opportunity to counter in its own work.
Crimes Against Humanity in Contemporary Tribunals
The ECCC definition of CAH is an almost verbatim repetition of Article 3 of the Statute of the ICTR, which contains a list of crimes that constitute CAH when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds. 87 A particularly significant development is that the two categories of CAH identified under customary international law -acts against a civilian population and persecution on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds -have been collapsed into one category under Article 3. Due to its similarities to the ECCC's formulation, the ICTR's jurisprudence is of particular interest as an example of how courts have interpreted such provisions, which will be returned to below.
In contrast, the ICTY and ICC have abandoned the discriminatory element of CAH -although persecution is included as a specific underlying crime -while retaining the notion of 'civilians' as victims. Statute, the inclusion of a civilian requirement proved controversial with some delegations preferring the wording 'any population' as opposed to 'any civilian population'. In the end, the latter term was agreed upon as it was held to be consistent with customary international law;
however, those against such wording were comforted by the fact that case-law existed to support a flexible interpretation of the term 'civilian', such as the Barbie case discussed earlier. 93 While the exclusion of a discriminatory element renders the jurisprudence of these courts less persuasive in the context of the ECCC, they still contain useful guidance on the interpretation of the term 'civilian'.
These contemporary formulations of CAH are a regression from customary international law and are troubling, as they potentially leave soldiers and combatants unprotected. Consequently, the question of how courts should interpret the phrase 'any civilian population' becomes of 
From Civilian to Hors de Combat
While the term 'civilian' is primarily understood as referring to non-combatants, case-law from the ICTR has adopted a broad interpretation of the term civilian, which incorporates hors de combat. 94 In Akayesu it was held to include 'people who are not taking any active part in the hostilities, including members of the armed forces who laid down their arms and those persons to exercise force'. 96 On the face of it, this latter interpretation could be viewed as regressive in before they were killed'. 98 Thus, the focus was on their heightened vulnerability rather than their formal status. We would argue that the ECCC should follow this approach: Khmer Rouge cadres subjected to purges would be in a position of heightened vulnerability, with their formal status having little relevance to their victimhood. Such an approach is also in keeping with that of customary international law post-Second World War.
Early jurisprudence from the ICTY similarly recognised the need to adopt a 'wide definition of civilian population'. 99 In Kupreskic, the ICTY juxtaposed the protection afforded to civilians as opposed to combatants under Article 5 of its Statute:
It would seem that a wide definition of "civilian" and "population" is intended. This is warranted first of all by the object and purpose of the general principles and rules of humanitarian law, in particular by the rules prohibiting crimes against humanity. The latter are intended to safeguard basic human values by banning atrocities directed against human dignity. One fails to see why only civilians and not also combatants should be protected by these rules (in particular by the rule prohibiting persecution),
given that these rules may be held to possess a broader humanitarian scope and purpose than those prohibiting war crimes.
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According to Ambos and Wirth, Kupreskic represents a human rights-based understanding of CAH, as 'not only the human rights of civilians but also those of soldiers can be violated'. not -but who were no longer taking part in hostilities when the crimes were perpetrated because they had either left the army or were no longer bearing arms or…had been placed hors de combat…'. The second category was to be determined by the 'specific situation of the victim the moment the crimes were committed, rather than his status'.
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It is clear from the above analysis that there has been continued recognition within contemporary courts that soldiers, combatants and those who have the legitimate means to exercise force can be victims of CAH where they are placed hors de combat: effectively demobilized and in a state of vulnerability. From what we know of the Cambodian context, the cadres were detained in security centres, suggesting that they were disarmed; thus, they were hors de combat and qualify as 'civilians' for the purpose of establishing CAH, so long as the discriminatory motive required under Article 5 of the ECCC Statute is proven. Indeed, the Khmer Rouge based its purges on the ethnicity, political or religious background of the soldiers as well as their lack of ideological commitment.
However, there has been a subsequent narrowing of the ICTY's approach to the term 'civilian'
and a growing consensus that the term should be defined as provided in Article 50 of Additional Protocol I, meaning that members of armed forces and other armed groups would be excluded. 103 Moreover, it must be noted that the broad categorization of civilian put forward in Blaškić (see above) was subsequently overturned on Appeal. The Appeal Chamber held that members of the armed forces and members of organized resistance groups cannot claim civilian status and that the Trial Chamber had erred in holding the specific situation of the victim at the time of the crime was determinative of one's status. 104 In a further narrowing of the definition, that 'qualify acts as crimes against humanity although they would be legitimate under IHL'. 109 Yet, our analysis has demonstrated that even humanitarian law recognises the need to consider the vulnerability of the individual as opposed to their formal status. Moreover, Bartels' view should be contrasted with that of Ambos and Wirth who argue that, as CAH can be committed in times of war and times of peace, the term 'civilian' should be interpreted broadly 'because it must cover all persons which are not protected by humanitarian law, especially in times of peace'. 110 Ambos and Wirth endorse the original interpretation of civilian as set out in Blaškić,
providing that 'it meets the needs of comprehensive protection of human rights very well since everyone except an active combatant of a hostile armed force is in a "specific situation"
requiring the protection of his or her human rights'. Katanga, the ICC held that 'the crime may be established even if the military operation also targeted a legitimate military objective. It is important, however, to establish that the primary object of the attack was the civilian population or individual civilians'. 113 While one could interpret the requirement that civilians must be the primary object of attack as overly restrictive, an expansive approach towards the interpretation of the term civilian would minimize this risk.
Indeed, in situations such as that before the ECCC, where a regime targets its own armed forces, the distinction between combatants and civilians becomes less relevant, as does the overall composition of the targeted population. Rather, as argued by Luban, it should be 'the use of political and military power to assault rather than protect the well-being of those over whom the perpetrators exercise de facto authority' that is the crux of CAH. 114 Thus, a focus on the intent of the perpetrator is of greater significance than the formal status of those victimised. law norms, which have sought to narrow the protection gap and protect those of 'inoffensive character', a characteristic not unique to those who benefit from formal civilian status.
Conclusion and Recommendations
We also looked for guidance within the Statutes and jurisprudence of contemporary courts, while acknowledging that these courts have not specifically addressed the question of whether attacks against armed forces can constitute an attack against a civilian population, and recognising their more limited relevance to the ECCC's analysis. We found that contemporary formulations of CAH have been inconsistent. While the ICTY and ICC have removed the requirement of persecution from their definitions, the ICTR has also collapsed the two categories into one, transposing the civilian requirement onto crimes of persecution. This merger arguably widens the protection gap in a way that is counter to the spirit in which the offence was created, as it risks leaving soldiers and combatants without protection under the law of CAH. However, an expansive interpretation of 'civilian' can counter this, and the ICTR has shown a willingness to include hors de combat within the category of 'civilian' in the Akayesu 125 case and the military cases. The ICTY has also occasionally adopted a broad interpretation, for example in the case of Blaškić. 126 While this case was ultimately overruled on appeal, we have argued that the standard set in Blaškić is in keeping with a human rightsbased approach to CAH. The Khmer Rouge's practice of purging appeared to involve arresting and sending to security centres those cadres who were deemed 'undesirable' whether due to their religion, ethnicity, or lack of ideological commitment. Such individuals would constitute hors de combat and therefore this jurisprudence legitimises the OCIJ recognising the purges of the Khmer Rouge cadres as CAH.
Unfortunately, the ICTY has shown a recent tendency to adopt a more restrictive interpretation of 'civilian', due to concerns over the blurring of lines between CAH and war crimes. However, 125 Akayesu, supra note 95. 126 Blaškić, supra note 102.
we would agree with the statement of the ECCC International CIJ, who observed that 'the entire distinction between combatants and civilians might only make sense if we are talking about combatants and civilians of the enemy population'. 127 In the context of the ECCC, what has occurred is a widespread attack on a population with discriminatory intent, 128 perpetrated by state actors against their own armed forces. As observed by the International CIJ, when a regime seeks to cleanse its own armed forces of soldiers holding a particular ethnicity or faith, the victims' combatant quality would be entirely irrelevant. 129 The ECCC has an opportunity to provide clarity to a complex area of law, to contribute significantly to the development of international criminal law, and to counter the regression that has emerged in the contemporary jurisprudence. We suggest that the ECCC take a human rights approach, which recognizes vulnerability, rather than the official status of the victim, as being relevant in interpreting 'civilian populations' and gives priority to the intention of the perpetrator. Such an approach would narrow the protection gap, and ensure that widespread and systematic abuses of state power are appropriately criminalised as CAH. Criminalization of CAH arose to protect individuals left vulnerable to abuse by those in power. 130 Symbolically, these crimes penalize acts that shock the conscience of humanity due to their flagrant disregard for human spirit, life, integrity and dignity. 131 The OCIJ should adopt an interpretation of Article 5 that is in keeping with the overall purpose of international criminal law, international human rights law, and international humanitarian law, to protect the basic values of human dignity, regardless of the legal status of those entitled to such protection. 132 As such, the breadth
